Drug lords have also been known to utilize the hawala system in order to gain access to their funds and to transfer such funds to terrorists, including the Taliban forces (Byrd and Buddenberg, n.d). According to Tan (2007) Taliban forces use such funds in order to purchase guns and also to entice impoverished young adults to join their cause. In effect, the financial support which these terrorist forces have been able to gain from drug lords has been used to secure their efforts against the government and against American as well as coalition forces (Tan, 2007).
Methods This study is a descriptive research, evaluating available data which seeks to discuss drugs and their impact on domestic terrorism. Various articles from journals, books, and news articles shall be assessed in relation to this topic. A specific set of data in relation to drug lords and their relationship to domestic terrorism in Afghanistan will form part of this analysis. Such analysis shall be presented based on the critical assessment of available information as well as correlations made by experts.
Findings For a long while, Afghanistan has experienced difficulties in securing a stable and centralized government. It was under British control at one point and was later controlled by various autocrats who were under influence from the Soviet Union (Chandra, 2006). Unfortunately, violence has long been an issue in Afghanistan and these moments impacted seriously on the state’s ability to secure stability. For a while, Afghanistan more or less exhibited all the qualities of a failed state (Chandra, 2006). Warlords, militias, as well as drug lords laid claim to various properties in Afghanistan.
As a result, the country became an ideal place for the cultivation of opium (Mankin, 2009). Violence and the lack of stable governance caused anarchy to dominate the country; and as a result opium cultivation and trafficking became an accepted way of life for the people. Since 2001, the invasion of the coalition forces increased the cultivation of opium driving these levels to 193,000 hectares in 2007 (Lacouture, 2006). From that time, this narcotic trend has persisted.
The deterioration of Afghan security conditions caused by the NATO and the US defeat of the Taliban troops placed the country at the point of insurgency; moreover, it also reenergized the opium economy (Risen, 2009). Insurgent leaders and drug lords also combined their efforts against their common enemy – the American troops and the Karzai government.
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