There was no clear direction given by the intelligence agencies probably because they neglected some important fundamentals. Simply stated, there was intelligence failure. The enemy was underestimated and so was the amount of control that they held, especially in the south. Another important factor that was overlooked was the enemy’s Order of Battle2. This was not looked into until almost two years later after the conflict had began. If the intelligence had given more accurate reports, the United States would probably have sent more troops earlier or maybe not gone ahead with the intervention.
The troops sent by the U. S during that time were as much as the reports given recommended. These recommendations were, of course, out of the reality. The United States intelligence neglected the power of the enemy which was well concentrated around the Communist Party3. This party had a collective identity which was called the ‘infrastructure’. The Central Intelligence Agency was not aware of this entity for almost two years into the conflict. This is despite the fact that there was a lot of evidence to identify the infrastructure.
The intelligence agencies were also not aware of the Viet Cong Security Service, which is said to be one of its main adversaries. Even to the present day, intelligence personnel are not fully aware of the strength of the enemy in Vietnam. A factor that also led to the failure of intelligence agencies in Vietnam is the imbalance of intelligence personnel. The Viet Cong agents were comparatively large in numbers as compared to those of the United States. The Viet agents were tens of thousands while the U. S had only hundreds.
This, as expected has had several consequences. The enemy is, therefore, able to not only control its losses but also to command most the battlefield and ground supplies. The intelligence agencies, therefore, provided more problems in the region than solutions. There are reports of atrocities that were committed by American military4. These range from rape to extermination to massacres of hundreds of people. The theory that was developed by the United States before going into Vietnam conflict was, to say the least, off point. This is because all the projected outcomes did not fall into place.
The United States has postulated that the fall of Vietnam state would make the whole of Asia a colony of the soviet. This, however, was not the case. After the conflict, the soviet was gone. The U. S apparently had interfered into an already existing conflict between the people of Vietnam state and the French5.
Buzzanco, Robert. Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Clausewitz, Carl, F. N. Maude, and Colone Graham. On War. New York: Wilder Publications,
Hartley, Stephen. Clausewitzs "remarkable Trinity": National Security Strategy and Presidential
Command and Control of the Armed Forces. Air War College, Air University, 1994.
McMurray, Andrew. The Vietnam War: Attitudinal Dispositions, Professional Assessments, and
Content Coverage Among Indiana High School United States History Teachers. Michigan: ProQuest, 2009.
Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio
Tse-Tung, Mao, Zedong Mao, and Samuel Griffith. On Guerrilla Warfare. Illinois: University of
Illinois Press, 2000.
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. eBookEden.com, 2009.